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Defensive deception in cyberspace 
Deception is a classic tactic in warfare – can’t we use 
it against cyberattacks? 
We can deceive as to who we are, what data and 
resources we have, and what we are executing. 
Deception can be effective because it is unexpected: 
Most computers are very honest. 
Deception can support either of two mutually 
exclusive goals: Get rid of attackers, or keep them 
logged in to exploit them (as in a honeypot). 













Causality: cause, effect, 
purpose, contradiction 








Best cyberspace deceptions (in decreasing 











 External precondition 
Measure 
Defense: 











Experimenting with cyberattackers 
Why can’t information security be an experimental 
science? 
We can try defenses in real time against live 
cyberattackers, not just theoretical attacks. 
Of course cyberattackers are varied, so we need to run 
experiments a long time.  But data storage is not a 
problem today. 
Yes, we can use honeypots – but they do not need to be 
passive.  They can interact and manipulate 
cyberattackers. 
Experiment 1: Packet modification 
Experiment 2: Scripted responses to protocols 
Experiment 3: A fake Web site 
Honeynet setup 
Honeypot Snort alert counts clustered 3 ways 
Experiment 1: Packet manipulations 
We used Snort Inline to systematically modify bits in 
packets sent to a honeypot. 
We measured length of time and number of attacks in 
different categories looking for a significant effect. 
There were significant differences, both increases and 
decreases in measures. 
 Control Exp.  1A Exp. 1B Exp.  1C Exp.  1D Exp.  1E 
FTP 0 0 0 68794 0 3735 
ICMP Ping 155 162 198 239 194 186 
MS-SQL 48 32 34 50 44 30 
NETBIOS 76 19 15 96 22 173 
POLICY 0 2 1 0 0 1 
SHELL- 
CODE 
74 57 33 38 65 148 
WEB 0 0 0 1 35 0 
 
Weaknesses of direct packet modification 
This is low-level interaction with networking 
protocols (level 2 of the OSI/ISO hierarchy). 
So figuring a good modification is difficult.  Much 
trial and error is necessary.  It’s like changing a 
character in a program hoping to improve it. 
Our experiments were slow -- each took a week to get 
sufficient data.  Using many machines simultaneously 
appears necessary. 
The space of possible modifications to packets is 
huge.  So even with a honeypot farm, it would take a 
long time to find good deceptions. 
Experiment 2: Dynamically changing HoneyD 
HoneyD is a open-source software for building low-
interaction honeypots.  (“Low-interaction” means 
simulating the first few steps of protocols, not their 
full functionality.) 
We faked a variety of configurations to see how 
cyberattackers responded: 
Configurations they responded to more than average 
would make good deceptions for enhancing 
honeypots and active scams on cyberattackers. 
Configurations they responded to less than average 
would make good deceptions for scaring away 
cyberattackers. 
Experiment 2 setup 
Configuration changes per week 
Week Experiment Week Experiment 
1 Control: normal activity 9 Same as week 8 
2 HoneyD with 32 addresses: too 
aggressive and got turned off by 
IT department 
10 Control: normal activity 
3 HoneyD with five addresses 11 Control, also no virtual machine 
4 Added simulated services 12 Back to week 9 configuration 
5 Removed one unhelpful service 13 Added telnet and modified virtual 
Windows configurations 
6 Switch of IP addresses since one 
was getting more attacks 
14 Control 
7 Same as week 6 15 Like week 13 but with Web server 
instead of telnet 
8 Using only 4 best scripts 
















1 No 438661 388 4 388 0 0 
3 Yes 1191410 8589 24 8366 2185 5 
4 Yes 1313693 259776 36 255744 4016 16 
5 Yes 701771 2525 12 1940 584 1 
6 Yes 906893 2823 17 2176 647 0 
7 Yes 740769 6686 11 2990 3696 0 
8 Yes 897552 3386 14 2144 1242 0 
9 Yes 951556 2957 19 2651 306 0 
10 No 618723 1325 13 757 568 0 
11 No 541740 756 16 476 270 10 
12 Yes 995235 2526 10 2270 256 0 
13 Yes 807712 3711 15 3445 266 0 
14 No 518659 488 5 488 0 0 
15 Yes 1066743 4694 14 3082 1612 0 
 









3 72.7 16.8 6.1 4.4 
4 4.3 1.5 1.6 92.7 
5 9.8 38.9 41.1 10.2 
6 12.4 56.4 21.9 9.3 
7 4.2 48.6 42.4 4.8 
8 7.3 30.9 50.2 11.6 
9 10.2 11.0 62.8 16.0 
12 10.6 26.7 53.5 9.2 
13 8.4 40.8 43.0 7.8 
15 4.6 49.9 40.0 5.7 
 
We had 4 virtual machines, and got different 
kinds of traffic on each. 
Ports and alerts 
The most common ports attacked were in order: 445 
(Microsoft Active Directory), 80 (HTML), 135 
(Microsoft Endpoint Mapper), 139 (NETBIOS), 53 
(DNS), and 22 (SSH). 
The most common alerts were in order: NETBIOS, 
Shellcode NOOPs, remote desktop requests, and 
attempted heap corruption. 
Experiment 3: A fake Web server 
Attackers liked Web exploits, even when we did not 
have a Web server. 
So we simulated a Web server by modifying 
HoneyD. 
We tested different kinds of error messages to see 
which ones caused the most effect on attackers. 
Attackers liked certain words and certain addresses.  
This suggests providing special responses to these. 
 
Results from Experiment 3 
Honeypot address Hits Configuration 
*.*.*.77 15,412 2003 Server with ftp and smtp service scripts 
*.*.*.70 9,900 Windows XP with no servicescript 
*.*.*.74 9,626 SQLserver with standard iis.sh script 
*.*.*.73 7,963 NT4 Web Server with iis.new.sh script 
*.*.*.79 7,668 Windows Xp with no service script 
 
 December January February 
Number of days running 12 21 9 
Rate of all Honeyd log entries 3389 3913 5695 
Rate of Snort alerts 176 208 1069 
Rate of all Web log entries 16.1 74.1 30.9 
Rate of GET commands 5.7 34.9 10.2 
Rate of OPTIONS commands 8.9 35.9 18.7 
Rate of HEAD commands 1.4 2.2 1.1 
 
Favorite input strings and user names of attackers 
These could be made names of pages and could also 
receive responses when entered other ways. 






































Attacker design of deceptive Web sites 
1. Find in GETs what pages attackers are requesting, 
what email addresses they are trying, and what 
arguments they are supplying. 
2. Give it to them: Make fake pages and fake responses 
for all the requests you saw. 
3. Go back to 1. 
 
 This approach can be balanced with inclusion of 
legitimate Web pages from other sites. 
 Note attackers will probably want to PUT as well as 
GET, at which point you can either deny them, say 
you will PUT but don’t, or PUT a defanged copy. 
General defensive deception: Software wrappers 
Attacker 









Decoy supervisor Intrusion-detection system 
Decoying rules 
Control wrappers with “deception control lists” 
Resource Action Decoy response 
C:\Program Files write Fake a correct write by providing 




write Behave normally 
C:\Program Files read Give fake info if any specified,  
otherwise the real info 
C:\Program Files execute Give one of 10 random error 
messages if a fake write done,  
else execute normally 




Lineprinter lpt1 read, 
write 
Give error message if file in  
"secrets"; delay 10 times normal 
 if remote user; else print normally 
 
Will deception hurt legitimate users? 
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Hacked Joker Deception 
scan ports 10 5 5 10 10 5 8 10 
connect at port 10 5 7 5 7 5 6 7 




10 5 5 5 10 7 8 7 
decompress file 0 7 5 0 5 5 5 5 
move file 0 7 5 2 8 5 5 7 
test operating 
system 
2 10 10 2 7 10 8 10 
Current research: Predicting future attacker actions 
Most anticipatory defense uses a Bayesian model of 
the attacker. 
A better model would reason by analogy: Given 
events A, f(A), g(A), predict f(g(A)). 























Comparison of Mean Prediction Accuracy when two atoms are swapped 




























































































































































Reasoning by analogy outperformed several versions of 
Bayesian reasoning and other simple reasoning methods. 
Conclusions 
You can test deception tactics systematically against 
live cyberattackers. 
However, it takes some resources.  With one 
honeypot with four virtual machines, data came 
slowly. 
Both attacker-encouragement and attacker-
discouragement effects are valuable. 
We only saw predominantly simpleminded attacks.  
However, our collection techniques are general and 
should catch any class of attack. 
 
 
